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DISCLAIMER: “Company A” is an entirely fictitious reference intended solely for the purposes of this document. When using this title, any similarity to any actual company, registered 
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1 ABSTRACT 
 
Risk is an unavoidable part of the aviation industry, and describes both an inherent uncertainty, and an appreciation of the degree 
to which this uncertainty matters [9]. It is a well-known aphorism that ‘one cannot manage what one cannot measure’, and so 
the identification of hazards is the first step towards the management of safety risk [11]. A hazard may be defined as something 
with “the potential to cause harm”, yet different attitudes and perceptions mean that their recognition may be highly subjective 
because of “[exposure] to sources of explicit and implicit bias”. This means that what appears hostile to some may appear benign 
to others [9]. 
 
In an effort to promote safety and sustain airworthiness, Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMO) are one of the most 
regulated aspects of the aviation industry. As an imperfect, human-built and human-led system, basic fallibility means that the 
performance of any aviation organisation will unavoidably deviate that which is planned. This research has shown that a balance 
of compliance and flexibility is essential to the continued operation of such systems in an “uncertain and dynamic world”, and 
so aviation is reliant upon the management of risk attitude to provide an enveloping response to uncertainty and safety risk [16]. 
 
Through analysis of the safety performance of an EASA registered Part 145 AMO, this project has shown that risk attitudes and 
perception play an integral role in the identification of safety risk. Whilst the scope and nature of the various risk attitude biases 
could not be fully quantified, further analysis has shown that Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement is the first step 
toward this goal, whilst helping to reduce uncertainty and manage subjectivity across the operational environment. 
 
Recommendations address the mitigation of conscious, subconscious and affective biases, and aim to enhance situational 
awareness and improve hazard identification. These include the standardisation of the risk assessment process, improved levels 
of quantitative performance monitoring, and improved awareness amongst operational personnel of the potential impact of 
specific situational risk attitude influences. 
 
Ultimately, this research has shown that the greatest asset to any AMO is its constituent staff members, and the promotion of 
risk attitude and error wisdom has been shown to enhance operational safety by allowing personnel to develop their 
understanding and management of their own limitations, whilst adapting their risk attitude to that required by the situation, the 
context and their skills. 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aviation industry is one of the most complex socio-technical systems ever developed, and air travel is widely regarded as 
the safest mode of transport in the world [23]. For many years, a key contributor to this enviable success has been the strategic 
utilisation of safety management systems (SMS); a toolbox for the systematic, proactive and business-like approach to the 
management of safety risk. 
 
As one of the core components of any SMS, the correct identification of hazards is the first step toward effective safety risk 
management because “hazards that go unnoticed cannot be managed” or controlled [4]. Should assessment of the probability of 
the hazard or of the severity of its consequences be insufficient, then the reliability and effectiveness of mitigation strategies is 
reduced, and the value of risk management cannot be assured. 
 
A key component in the identification of hazards is the process of perception; the fundamental ability “to see, hear, or become 
aware of something”. As risks are identified, assessed and managed by people, perception does not always mirror reality, and so 
what appears hostile to some may appear benign to others. This makes the hazard identification process highly subjective, and 
so in order to improve the management of safety risk and enhance underlying decision making, it is important to recognise and 
understand the values, attitudes and behaviours that subconsciously influence both defence and mitigation strategies. 
 
In an attempt to manage the risks posed by actions and behaviour, aviation deploys a variety of strategies in an attempt to 
constrain and regulate both behaviours and their consequences. This has resulted in the widespread use of tools including 
checklists, training, and other “soft” mitigations. Unfortunately, whilst the importance of these risk management techniques is 
undeniable, they are often inherently flawed, because it is impossible to anticipate in a systematic or reliable manner “typical 
human frailties such as distraction, tiredness and forgetfulness”. Such frailties result in an unavoidable deviation from planned 
system performance, and so the effectiveness of soft mitigations is limited by their context of creation and their reliance upon 
human performance [11].  
 
Thankfully, by recognising the limitations of rule-based defence and mitigation strategies, an SMS can provide a tailored and 
specific framework from where an organisation can manage risk within its own unique operational environment, whilst reducing 
the “contextual limitations” that beset sheer regulatory compliance [11]. 
 
Unfortunately, whilst the dynamic and flexible nature of an SMS can be of considerable benefit, it must be recognised that 
Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMO’s) remain one of the most regulated areas of the aviation industry.  This regulation 
is essential to support the set, non-subjective standards necessary to attain airworthiness, and so determine whether an aircraft is 
safe for flight [20]. This means that to effectively promote safe operation, an AMO must balance the flexibility of safety 
management against the constraints inherent to compliance. An appropriate understanding of the true drivers behind the hazard 
identification process is therefore fundamental (Figure 1 & Graph 1): 
 
 
Figure 1: The Balance of Resources 
 
 
[Source: Created by author through interpretation of “The Management Dilemma” (The Dilemma of 2P’s) from:  
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). “Safety Management Manual (SMM)”. DOC 9859 AN/474. ICAO, 2009 – 2nd edition. (Page 3-3)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION IN APPROVED MAINTENANCE ORGANISATIONS: 
THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK ATTITUDE 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Compliance vs. Flexibility 
 
(Source: Concept created by author) 
 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to investigate the underlying drivers of the hazard identification process, this study utilises primary safety occurrence 
data from an EASA registered Part-145 AMO to produce a quantitative interpretation of safety performance. As primary data, 
this quantitative information was collected and analysed directly by the author from operational safety data. This data was 
obtained from a participant organisation, referred to exclusively within this paper as “Company A”. 
 
Quantitative analysis has been used to assess the attitudes toward the hazards, risks and threats that contribute to the creation of 
“Company A” defence strategies, supporting qualitative analysis of the complex influence of perception and risk attitudes on the 
hazard identification process. This is achieved through examination of the existing attitudes and perceptions of individuals and 
the impact of general risk attitude situational influences, against comparison with the generic risk attitude spectrum. 
 
The intrinsic variability of human psychology means that different perceptions and risk attitudes are inevitable, and unavoidable 
biases such as distraction, fatigue and task familiarity introduce inherent system subjectivity. By analysing quantitative and 
qualitative safety data, this research aims to create practical recommendations to reduce the subjectivity between different 
perceptions and risk attitudes, by helping to standardise behaviour, improve situational awareness and increase process resilience. 
It is hoped that through development of the management and assessment of risk attitude, these recommendations can help 
“Company A” to better understand and manage its unique operational environment whilst continuing to improve safety defences. 
 
4 RESULTS 
 
To support the requirements of its safety reporting policy, “Company A” maintains an electronic database of all safety reports, 
using a computerised software package [19]. In order to collate and process data, this software uses quality assurance techniques 
combined with traditional flight safety theory, and to assist in the safety performance monitoring and measurement process, all 
reports are allocated the following criteria: 
 
 Occurrence Type  Occurrence Date  Occurrence Category  Occurrence Number 
 Location  Risk  Likelihood  Severity 
 
Primarily, each report was correlated according to its “category”. “Company A” operates a fixed number of categories, and these 
include examples such as “damage through collision”, “installation error”, and “procedures not followed”. Within the database, 
each occurrence is automatically assigned a safety risk defined as either “low”, “medium”, or “high”, and this risk relates to the 
perceived potential impact of the occurrence on flight safety [1]. 
 
As the first quantitative assessment of the organisation’s safety data, “Company A” defined a fixed 10-month period for analysis. 
This period presented 197 occurrences, of which 4 were excluded as they did not contain values for risk, likelihood and severity. 
The remaining 193 occurrences concerned 44 occurrence categories, with the most common event type being “Installation Error”. 
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Overall, the average number of occurrences across the 62 categories was 4.48, and the standard deviation was 5.06. The range 
of occurrence quantities spanned from 1 to 22, and 63.2% of all occurrences could be found in just 10 of the occurrence 
categories. This suggests that majority of occurrences are distributed over a narrow spread of event types. 
 
A breakdown of the risk, severity and likelihood across the 193 occurrences may be observed as follows (Table 1): 
 
Table 1: Summary of Risk, Severity & Likelihood 
 
(Source: Created by Author from “Company A” Safety Data) 
 
 
The results of Table 1 shows that overall, 79% of “Company A” events are low risk, 70% of all occurrences are 
insignificant/minor in severity, and 64% improbable/possible in likelihood. The computerised software used by “Company A” 
automatically generates a value of safety risk dependent on the likelihood and severity data that is provided through qualitative 
assessment by “Company A” personnel. This technique follows the general principles of the ARMS Methodology for Operational 
Risk Assessment in Aviation Organisations [1]. 
 
Across, the period of analysis, “Company A” serviced 1261 aircraft, and to provide a supporting background to the initial data 
extracted, each aircraft was included in the dataset from the start of its maintenance input. This means that each aircraft was 
accounted for in only one monthly period, even if the aircraft’s stay was for an extended duration. In an attempt to enhance the 
reliability of the results, further information was not included owing to the complex and manual nature of the data extraction 
process. 
 
By combining the results of the dataset with the total aircraft serviced, it is possible to produce a summary of the relationship 
between aircraft, occurrences, risk, severity and likelihood (Table 2): 
 
Table 2: Overall Safety Statistics 
 
Overall Results 
Total Number of Aircraft 1261 
Total Number of Occurrences 193 
Average Occurrences Per Aircraft 0.16 
Risk Average 1.21 
Severity Average 2.21 
Likelihood Average 1.83 
 
(Source: Created by Author from “Company A” Safety Data) 
(Please note: The values given for risk, severity and likelihood relate to the “x” values shown in column 1 of Table 1) 
 
In order to provide additional contextual information and support enhanced conclusions, 20% of the dataset was extracted for 
further qualitative analysis using stratified sample techniques. This method ensured that different events were given a different 
representation within the sample, proportionate to their frequency and contribution to the entire population. 
x Risk n % (0 d.p) nx 
Overall 
Risk Avg. 
3 HIGH 1 1%  3  
2 MEDIUM 39 20% 78 (nx / x) 
1 LOW 153 79% 153  
    193 (100%) 234 1.21 
 
 
    
x Severity n % (0 d.p) nx 
Overall 
Severity Avg. 
5 Massive 2 1% 10  
4 Extensive 3 2% 12  
3 Major 41 21% 123  
2 Minor 135 70% 270  
1 Insignificant 12 6% 12  
    193 (100%) 427 2.21 
 
 
    
x Likelihood n % (0 d.p) nx 
Overall 
Likelihood 
Avg. 
5 Common 0 0% 0  
4 Frequent 3 2% 12  
3 Occasional 14 7% 42  
2 Possible 124 64% 248  
1 Improbable 52 27% 52  
    193 (100%) 354 1.83 
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The top-5 occurrence categories were extracted from the whole population, and first sorted according to their frequency. They 
were then stratified again to provide a proportionate sample of occurrences according to their risk. Individual occurrence events 
were then extracted from the overall population using a random sampling technique. The codes within this table relate to the raw 
occurrence identification numbers in the “Company A” safety database. The stratified extraction results may be shown as follows 
(Table 3): 
 
Table 3: Occurrence Extract 
Category 
RISK 
 TOTAL 
Low Subtotal Medium  Subtotal High Subtotal 
Installation Error  
O
2
9
4
1
-1
3
 
O
3
7
3
-1
4
 
O
2
4
3
6
-1
3
 
O
4
3
1
-1
4
 
O
1
1
4
8
-1
4
 
O
3
1
0
8
-1
4
 
O
3
1
1
6
-1
4
 
7 
O
3
1
5
9
-1
3
 
O
9
5
-1
4
 
O
3
1
0
4
-1
3
 
3 
O
1
1
3
1
-1
4
 
1 11 
Damage to 
Aircraft 
Components  
O
8
1
-1
4
 
O
2
5
9
5
-1
4
 
O
1
3
7
-1
4
 
O
6
7
-1
4
 
O
2
0
7
7
-1
4
 
O
2
9
3
0
-1
3
 
O
2
6
1
-1
4
 
O
1
2
8
9
-1
4
 
8 
O
2
8
5
0
-1
3
 
O
2
2
-1
4
 
2 x
 
0 10 
Collision/ Impact  
O
2
6
0
8
-1
4
 
O
2
4
4
1
-1
3
 
O
2
8
4
4
-1
4
 
O
2
3
6
2
-1
4
 
O
7
5
-1
4
 
5  
O
2
8
7
7
-1
3
 
O
2
9
5
3
-1
3
 
O
8
0
4
-1
4
 
3 x
 
0 8 
Health and Safety 
Issue 
O
2
9
0
9
-1
3
 
O
2
0
0
-1
4
 
O
2
0
8
1
-1
4
 
O
3
0
4
2
-1
4
 
O
2
1
9
1
-1
4
 
5 
O
7
2
9
-1
4
 
1 x
 
0 6 
Parts Damaged/ 
Unserviceable  O
5
4
4
-1
4
 
O
3
1
2
8
-1
4
 
2 
O
1
6
4
5
-1
4
 
O
2
4
5
7
-1
4
 
O
2
5
8
6
-1
4
 
3 x
 
0 5 
 TOTAL 7 12 6 2 27 2 4 3 3 12 0 0 1 0 1 40 
 
 
Of the 45 events in the stratified sample, 12 were excluded as they provided either inappropriate/insufficient evidence for 
analysis, or insufficient information to support an assessment of risk attitude. In order to support additional conclusions, the 33 
remaining occurrences were then re-categorised by aircraft type, type of maintenance undertaken, and the type of safety report, 
a graphical extract of this data is shown below (Graph 2 & Graph 3): 
 
 
Graph 2: Number of Occurrences per Aircraft Type 
 
 
Graph 3: Number of Occurrences per Maintenance Category 
 
(Source: Created by author through interpretation of “Company A” Safety and Maintenance Planning Data) 
 
 
For “Company A” operations, the modal results from the stratified sample conclude that a safety occurrence is most likely to 
involve a low-risk installation error during “Category C+” maintenance on “Vickers VC-10” or “Convair 990” aircraft. In order 
to promote the reliability of research findings, it cannot be determined to what proportion these aircraft types and maintenance 
criteria represent the overall operations of “Company A”, because factors including increased aircraft type exposure would 
increase the inherent probability of a safety event. This means that whilst the stratified sample is representative of the safety 
occurrence dataset, it may not necessarily be representative of the overall “Company A” operations. 
 
The most common resolution proposed within the population sampled was a basic reminder of procedural adherence. This 
resolution was deemed sufficient for 33% of all events, and a further 20% suggested procedural re-design in an attempt to prevent 
re-occurrence. The final 47% of recommendations were split equally between events containing an assortment of context specific 
proposals, and others where no recommendations were provided at all. 
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Overall, the results within the stratified sample appear to demonstrate that “Company A” is reliant upon traditional “soft” 
mitigation strategies, in contrast to the mitigation of underlying causal factors such as inadequate human performance, distraction 
or fatigue. This traditional approach to risk mitigation suggests that by improving its understanding, management and recognition 
of the effects of risk attitude, there is significant potential for “Company A” to improve its safety defences by implementing 
strategies to target system-wide human performance deficits, whilst continuing to balance necessary compliance against system 
flexibility. 
 
5 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
By analysing the relationship between occurrence frequency and the number of aircraft serviced, results show that for “Company 
A”, the relationship between occurrence frequency and safety risk is not proportional. This suggests that “Company A” 
operations concur with the accepted theory that the relationship between occurrence frequency and safety risk is non-linear. This 
suggests that a high number of aircraft serviced is not necessarily indicative of “high” risk, and there are a much greater number 
of high frequency-lower risk events than serious fatal accidents. This occurs because statistically, “millions of operational errors 
are made before a major safety breakdown occurs” [11 & 22]. 
 
The inherent uncertainty involved in the management of risk makes it “important to understand [the] factors capable of 
influencing individual risk attitudes, so that their effect[s] can be countered and managed proactively where they lead to 
inappropriate responses to uncertainty”. The assessment of “how well people understand the chances that they take, and whether 
they embrace the consequences” is inherently different for different individuals, and this makes it possible to assign “headlines 
to describe alternative positions adopted by people when faced with uncertainty” [8 & 9]. 
 
Of the events within this study, the results of the stratified sample showed that: 
 
o 47% of events provided evidence of an active decision making process, 53% did not. 
o 62% included an inappropriate or “low” perception of hazard probability. A further 18% showed a “medium” perception, 
10% showed “high” perception, and 20% could not be assessed.  
o 44% included an inappropriate or “low” perception of a hazard’s impact magnitude. A further 35% showed a “medium” 
perception, 6% a “high” perception, and 15% could not be assessed. 
o 43% of events contained a “high” degree of control or choice over the active situation. A further 17% were “low”, 10% 
were medium, and 30% could not be assessed. 
o 38% had an accurate assessment of the closeness of the risk in time, 42% did not. 
o 43% had a “high” perception of the potential for direct consequences. A further 27% showed “low” perception, and the 
remaining 30% were split equally between “medium” and “unable to assess”. 
o Overall, 28% of occurrences contained insufficient information to support analysis in at least one of the categories required. 
These occurrences were excluded. 
o 93% of the sample were “error reports”, 7% were “hazard reports”. 
o 72% of events resulted in “tangible” evidence, such as aircraft damage, which could not be ignored. 
(Please Note: All percentages are correct to 0 decimal places) 
 
 
When combined, results show that the modal occurrence within the stratified sample contains a low/inadequate perception hazard 
impact magnitude, and an inadequate perception of the probability or frequency of occurrence. When combined with the 
control/degree of choice over an active situation, these results suggest that subconcious perception and risk attitude play a 
significant role in actions, behaviour and decision making across the occurrence sample. This is in contrast to examples of active, 
conscious risk taking or deliberately reckless behaviour. 
 
As a key element in the recognition of uncertainty, perception is an integral foundation in the risk management process. 
Unfortunately, basic human fallibility means that perception and risk attitudes are “exposed to sources of explicit and implicit 
bias, since all elements of the risk management process are performed by individuals”. The three main categories of bias are 
referred to as conscious, subconscious and affective [9]. 
The inherent existence of all three biases in fundamental human psychology means that each factor must have its own 
consequences, and so effective quantitative Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement (SPMM) is vital if their effects 
are to be monitored, and active and latent and hazardous conditions are to be detected. This means that by facilitating causal 
chain analysis, SPMM is capable of looking past an event outcome to provide an invaluable insight into the true causal factors. 
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By recognising the widespread applicability of such factors as distraction or adverse time pressures, SPMM can then support the 
framework necessary to mitigate the same potential contributory factors in future, unrelated events [11].  
 
The importance of SPMM means that “Company A” should continue to develop its safety database and recording categories, 
and so improve its collection of the high-frequency, low-consequence event data capable of providing large quantities of 
information devoid of the contextually limited conditions of an accident or incident. This information has the potential to provide 
“Company A” with the quantitative data necessary to reliably monitor and mitigate the effect of various risk attitude influences, 
whilst continuing to improve learning potential and manage operational risk. 
 
“Company A” should attempt to increase the proportion of proactive and non-punitive hazard reporting, and reinforce its 
importance across the entire organisation. This should be supplemented by an anonymous reporting system, and a receptive 
safety attitude whereby feedback is provided to individuals who report their concerns, and material is safeguarded so that it used 
solely for the enhancement of system safety. Importantly, the success of any reporting culture can only be achieved alongside an 
appreciation of the essential foundations necessary to support a “just”, proactive and generative safety culture [11]. 
 
Further analysis of maintenance planning data could also be incorporated within future safety reports to incorporate factors 
including the distribution of aircraft across an annual maintenance period, the ratio of scheduled/unscheduled maintenance, 
aircraft age and familiarity, and the recording of any delays to the maintenance timetable. This information could be used to 
support additional quantitative conclusions, and additional personnel information could continue to monitor other human factors 
including staffing levels, personnel experience, and task allocation alongside other latent individual and group risk attitudes. 
 
In addition, whilst “Company A” currently assesses risk against the potential impact on flight safety, this strategy is not without 
limitations. Risk is a complex entity, and it must be acknowledged that different events will carry inherently different levels of 
different risk types, including the risk to personnel safety, risk of aircraft damage and potential business/commercial risk. 
“Company A” should therefore consider the benefits of incorporating different risk categories in order to increase the value of 
its SPMM. 
 
In summary, whilst the results of this study are summarised from a much larger project producing over 20 specific 
recommendations, the stratified sample has shown that it is not yet possible to numerically quantify the risk attitude and 
perception biases that are present within “Company A” operations because of the variable and subjective nature of the current 
SPMM process. This means that “Company A” must recognise that an explicit decision making process, optimised 
communications, and an increase in situational awareness are essential in reducing bias and uncertainty, because central to the 
achievement of any goal is a “clear understanding of the nature of the [risks involved] as well as the ability to determine the 
influence of risk attitude on overall decision making” [8]. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
The results of this study have demonstrated the significant relationship between risk perception, risk attitude, and the efficacy of 
the hazard identification process. A considerable number of conscious, subconscious and affective influences are known to affect 
the management of perceptions and risk attitude, and so the management of this subjectivity is essential if the appropriate balance 
between system compliance and flexibility is to be ascertained. 
 
Situational awareness is key to reducing uncertainty and understanding “how people’s actions and assessments actually made 
sense at the time”. “Progress on safety comes from understanding and influencing these connections” and this can only be 
achieved through the continual monitoring of operational performance using human-centric reporting methods, safety surveys 
and internal safety investigations whilst continuing to create contexts and situations in which the correct perception and risk 
attitude are most likely to be adopted by both the system and an individual [2]. 
 
In order to enhance its latent system understanding and improve situational awareness, “Company A” should also acknowledge 
the potential benefits of risk attitude diagnosis and assessment. By helping to “diagnose the presence and strength of various 
drivers of risk culture”, such assessment would help to facilitate minor and routine adjustments to operations, and make the 
organisation “alert and responsive to both upside and downside uncertainty”. For this reason, “Company A” should consider the 
adoption of a strategic audit of risk attitudes as part of a strategy for both new and existing employees [9]. 
 
Such audits could utilise scenario based assessments, and both individual and group based questionnaires could be developed to 
expose a hypothetical risk(s), and then assess and evaluate participants chosen responses. This would allow the comparison and 
assessment of both individual and group risk attitudes, and “Company A” could utilise factors such as the framing effect to 
influence survey design, and so recognise the implications of question wording and form [21]. In addition to operational changes, 
a strategic audit also has the potential to allow “Company A” to monitor and improve the performance of its safety culture, 
minimise threats and maximise opportunities [13]. 
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Importantly, it must be recognised that the greatest asset to any AMO is its constituent staff members. Responsible for both 
system design and operation, it is these individuals who make the “moment-to-moment adjustments” necessary to ensure that 
operation is successful in an environment vulnerable to “unidentified effects”. This means that a mindful organisation recognises 
that “there is variation in [routine activities], but there is stability in the cognitive processes that make sense of this activity”. The 
monitoring, management and understanding of these cognitive activities is therefore integral to the management of safety risk 
[16]. 
 
By providing “instruction[s] on error-provoking conditions”, it is possible for “Company A” to provide “frontline professionals 
[the] mental skills necessary [to make] rough and ready assessment of the error risk in any given situation”. This assessment can 
be compared against a scale devised by and appropriate for “Company A” operations, and so allow personnel to further their 
appreciation of their own perceptions and risk attitude. If utilised correctly, examples of error wisdom methodology have the 
potential to promote mitigating actions, and the avoidance of situations where a high error or risk potential is perceived [16].  
 
In conclusion, this study has helped to demonstrate that risk attitude is an essential component in the hazard identification process, 
and for a human-centric system, the individual is not only capable of being a system’s single greatest weakness, but also its 
single greatest asset. Ultimately, this means that despite complex defence and mitigation strategies, safe and sustainable operation 
can only be achieved by having the right person, in the right place, with the right response, at the right time, and it is only through 
enhancement of its management and understanding of risk attitude that “Company A” can take one step further toward this 
illusive and virtuous goal. 
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